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CORRESPONDENCE 
Saving the Self! 
Daniel R. Ortiz* 
In a recent article, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 1 
Stephen A. Gardbaum accurately diagnoses one of the greatest 
problems in contemporary political and legal theory: the "complete 
confusion"2 about what communitarianism means. Not only do its 
critics disagree about its content, but, as Gardbaum shows, com-
munitarians themselves fail to comprehend that communitarianism 
makes several different kinds of claims. Most important, com-
munitarians often fail to see that some communitarian claims can ac-
tually underwrite liberalism and defend it from other traditional 
communitarian critiques. Simply put, Gardbaum argues that much of 
the communitarian-liberal debate, probably the central debate in polit-
ical and legal theory for the past twenty years, is no debate at all. 
Much of the participants' disagreement, though sharp, is only appar-
ent and stems from conceptual misunderstanding. Instead of arguing 
about the nature, source, and character of human political identity, we 
have simply been talking past one another all these years.3 
Gardbaum's basic insight is, I think, both powerful and correct. 4 
We have been seeing contradiction and conflict where there often is 
* Professor of Law and Harrison Foundation Research Professor, University of Virginia. 
B.A. 1978, Yale; M.Phil. 1980, Oxford; J.D. 1983, Yale. - Ed. 
1. Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
685 (1992). 
2. Id. at 691. 
3. For a representation of this view in mainstream philosophical literature, see Charles Tay-
lor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 
159 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989). 
4. Although I do have some objections to his account, they do not detract from his overall 
accomplishment. For example, Gardbaum's claim that there are only three forms of strong com-
munity, see Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 719, would surprise some feminist scholars and critical 
race theorists. Also, many might quibble with parts of Gardbaum's particular characterizations 
of major legal theorists in the second half of his essay. Gardbaum describes Robert Bork, for 
example, as both a substantive and metaethical communitarian. Id. at 747-49. The second char-
acterization is at least unsubtle. As Gardbaum himself notes, Bork gives some play to metaethi-
cal subjectivism in even his most recent writings. Id. at 747-48 ("[l]n claiming that when a judge 
invalidates legislation without explicit support from the text of the Constitution, that judge is 
simply imposing her own moral preferences on that of the majority, Bork is himself relying on 
moral relativism.") (footnote omitted). In Bork's earlier writings, radical metaethical subjectiv-
ism completely predominates. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend-
ment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8-11 (1971). 
1018 
March 1993] Correspondence 1019 
none at all. As important and salutary as his account is, however, it 
deserves response. His taxonomy of communitarianism, the heart of 
his piece, well shows that communitarianism makes fundamentally 
different types of claims. It does not, however, make as many different 
kinds of claims as he suggests; it makes two different types of claims, 
no more than that. This disagreement may appear a quibble, but by 
proliferating the claims of community Gardbaum threatens to confuse 
further the very debate he seeks to clarify and, more important, to 
undercut some of his own quite powerful insights. 
To see the dangers to which this proliferation leads, we must first 
understand each of the different types of communitarian claims 
Gardbaum identifies and how he believes they relate to one another. 
To Gardbaum, communitarianism encompasses three very different 
claims. These are "(1) community as a causal factor in the constitu-
tion of personal identity (antiatomism); (2) community as a particular 
substantive value (strong communitarianism); and (3) community as 
the source of value (metaethical communitarianism)."5 The deep con-
fusion of communitarianism stems from people's not realizing that 
"the[se] three communitarian claims are independent of each other 
and are not ... necessarily connected."6 In other words, to 
Gardbaum, adopting or rejecting one claim does not commit one to a 
particular position on either of the other two. Most interestingly, 
Gardbaum argues that antiatomism and metaethical communitarian-
ism do not entail strong communitarianism.7 Contrary to many com-
munitarian attacks on liberalism, we can believe we are socially 
constituted and still hold strongly individualistic political values. 
This last point is clearly correct8 and goes far toward undermining 
several well-known communitarian critiques of liberalism, most nota-
bly Michael Sandel's.9 The difficulty lies with Gardbaum's picture of 
a different relationship, the one between antiatomism and metaethical 
communitarianism. Simply put, they are not independent: accepting 
metaethical communitarianism does commit one to antiatomism. In 
other words, if we believe community is the source of value, we must 
also believe in a socially constituted self. Significantly, though 
Gardbaum several times asserts the independence of all three claims, 10 
5. Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 692. 
6. Id. at 691-92 (discussing Michael Sandel). 
7. Id. at 701. 
8. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, The Price of Metaphysics: Deadlock in Constitutional Theory, in 
PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 311, 317-18 (Michael Brent & William Weaver eds., 1991). 
9. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JusncE (1982). 
10. See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note l, at 689, 691-92. 
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he never specifically argues that antiatomism and metaethical commu-
. nitarianism are independent from each other. Rather, his argument 
explicitly addresses only the independence of strong communitarian-
ism from each of the other two claims.11 
At first glance, antiatomism and metaethical communitarianism do 
appear quite different. Antiatomism stands for the proposition that 
individuals are not "essentially self-constituted, unencumbered, and 
self-sufficient" but rather "are 'partly defined by the communities 
[they] inhabit.' " 12 It asserts that communities do not exist as collec-
tions of sovereign individuals; rather, individuals exist as members of a 
sovereign group. The community, in other words, enjoys ontological 
priority over the individual. Metaethical communitarianism, on the 
other hand, concerns the source of human value. It "holds that values 
are constituted at the level of community."13 As Gardbaum notes, it 
makes a claim about the "source of value, not the content."14 In other 
words, it tells us only what "grounds" our values, not what those val-
ues are. 
In these terms, however, antiatomism is nothing more than one 
aspect of metaethical communitarianism.15 Adopting community as 
the ground for value necessarily commits one to some view of a so-
cially constituted self. As Gardbaum recognizes: 
The social constitution of identity ~ antiatomism,] means ... tha[t] 
our identities are "embedded" and "implicated" in the purposes and val-
ues of our societies. These are our encumbrances. It means no more and 
no less than the notion that, had we been brought up in a different soci-
ety from the one we were in fact brought up in, we would now be differ-
ent people in certain essential respects. 16 
In other words, antiatomism holds that our social beliefs and prac-
tices, our history, and our traditions are what make possible our par-
ticular conception of the self. The self as the locus of agency is at 
bottom a social practice just like all the other practices that metaethi-
cal communitarianism underwrites. In short, Gardbaum's antiatom-
ism is not an independent communitarian claim, but just metaethical 
11. See id. at 693, 701-05 (asserting independence ofantiatomism and strong communitarian· 
ism); id. at 695, 698-99, 705-07, 717-19 (asserting independence of metaethical and strong 
comm unitarianism). 
12. Id. at 701 (quoting Michael J. Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 6 
(Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984)). 
13. Gardbaum, supra note l, at 706. 
14. Id. 
15. While I am most concerned in this correspondence to establish that metaethical commu· 
nitarianism entails antiatomism, the converse is also true. Believing that society carves out the 
self conflicts with both subjectivism and objectivism, the two metaethical alternatives. 
16. Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 704. 
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comm.unitarianism applied to the belief and practice we call the self. 
Human identity at this fundamental level is just another social 
product. 
One might try to preserve the independence of antiatomism and 
metaethical comm.unitarianism by distinguishing between community 
as the source of abstract selfhood, on the one hand, and as the source 
of particular, breathing selves, on the other. The former would be a 
clear metaethical claim, while the latter, one might argue, is not. The 
community, in other words, might carve out the self as the fundamen-
tal unit of agency but define no particular people. 
Gardbaum does not make this move, and for good reason. He 
rightly believes that the community determines the extent to which 
individuals can choose their ends. As he puts it: "Individual identity 
depends significantly upon the values embedded in the social practices 
of society, and the individualistic values of freedom and autonomy are 
central values embedded in ours. In liberal societies, individuals 
choose their ends, but they cannot be said to choose to choose 
them."17 Metaethical comm.unitarianism entails, moreover, that the 
community is what defines the costs associated with the particular 
ends among which individuals can choose. This is part of what it 
means for the community to determine value. But if the community 
determines the extent to which people can choose their ends, the ends 
that are available to them, and the costs associated with different 
choices, then "individuals are 'partly defined by the communities 
[they] inhabit,' " 18 which is one of Gardbaum's characterizations of 
antiatomism. Saying that community grounds all value, in other 
words, necessarily implies that it grounds identity as well. 
Maintaining the independence of antiatomism and metaethical 
comm.unitarianism endangers Gardbaum's project not just because it 
confuses what he would make clear, but also because it undercuts his 
primary achievement. Gardbaum replaces the old, tired picture of at-
omistic liberalism with a liberalism grounded in community practice. 
In this world, individuals enjoy autonomy not because they are sover-
eign subjects but because the community they live in, which is sover-
eign, believes they should enjoy it. In short, Gardbaum shows how 
liberalism can rest on communitarian underpinnings. He provides in-
dividualist politics with a social ontology, and, to me, this is right. 
Insisting on the independence of antiatomism from metaethical com-
munitarianism, however, makes this picture difficult to sustain. 
17. Id. at 703. 
18. Id. at 701 (quoting Sandel, supra note 12, at 6). 
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By insisting that the self can be different from all other values, 
beliefs, and practices, Gardbaum invests it with a different and, one 
suspects, prior ontological status. Even if all our values ultimately rest 
on social practice, the self might not. Something else could stand be-
hind it. Whatever this other thing is, however, it has both some role in 
defining the values the self picks and, eventually, some determining 
effect on which values circulate through the society in which the indi-
vidual lives and how they circulate through it. This would contradict, 
however, the idea that the community itself grounds value. For 
whatever else underwrites the self now plays some role in constituting 
value. Thus, if antiatomism is independent of metaethical communi-
tarianism, the community cannot by itself underwrite liberal politics 
after all. The traditional picture of metaphysical atomism is inconsis-
tent with metaethical communitarianism. 
As in all great scholarship, Gardbaum's error instructs us. That 
Gardbaum, one of the keenest analysts of community, could himself 
confuse its claims shows how deeply embedded in our thought tradi-
tional notions of the individual are. Gardbaum wants to show that 
community can underwrite liberalism, but at the same time he wants 
to retain some notion of the self as not necessarily constituted by soci-
ety. This he cannot do. The self is for us a centrally important con-
struct, but it is a construct nonetheless. We cannot save the kind of 
independent space for it - apart from all other values - that 
Gardbaum would permit. We may flatter ourselves by trying, we may 
even come to believe that our identities are not ''just" a question of 
how our community has raised us to think about ourselves, but if we 
do believe it, we ultimately undermine all that Gardbaum would 
achieve. 
